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Modest Nonconceptualism

Epistemology, Phenomenology, and Content
Verkaufsrang21033inPhilosophie
BuchKartoniert, Paperback
268 Seiten
Englisch
Verfügbare Formate
BuchKartoniert, Paperback
EUR93,49
BuchGebunden
EUR93,49
The author defends nonconceptualism, the claim that perceptual experience is nonconceptual and has nonconceptual content. Continuing the heated and complex debate surrounding this topic over the past two decades, she offers a sustained defense of a novel version of the view, Modest Nonconceptualism, and provides a systematic overview of some of the central controversies in the debate....mehr

Produkt

KlappentextThe author defends nonconceptualism, the claim that perceptual experience is nonconceptual and has nonconceptual content. Continuing the heated and complex debate surrounding this topic over the past two decades, she offers a sustained defense of a novel version of the view, Modest Nonconceptualism, and provides a systematic overview of some of the central controversies in the debate.
An explication of the notion of nonconceptual content and a distinction between nonconceptualist views of different strengths starts off the volume, then the author goes on to defend participants in the debate over nonconceptual content against the allegation that their failure to distinguish between a state view and a content view of (non)conceptualism leads to fatal problems for their views. Next, she makes a case for nonconceptualism by refining some of the central arguments for the view, such as the arguments from fineness of grain, from contradictory contents, from animal and infant perception, and from concept acquisition. Then, two central objections against nonconceptualism are rebutted in a novel way: the epistemological objection and the objection from objectivity.
Modest Nonconceptualism allows for perceptual experiences to involve some conceptual elements. It emphasizes the relevance of concept employment for an understanding of conceptual and nonconceptual mental states and identifies the nonconceptual content of experience with scenario content. It insists on the possibility of genuine content-bearing perceptual experience without concept possession and is thus in line with the Autonomy Thesis. Finally, it includes an account of perceptual justification that relies on the external contents of experience and belief, yet is compatible with epistemological internalism.
Details
ISBN/EAN978-3-319-37139-9
ProduktartBuch
EinbandartKartoniert, Paperback
Erscheinungsjahr2016
Erscheinungsdatum15.10.2016
AuflageSoftcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 2015
Seiten268 Seiten
SpracheEnglisch
Artikel-Nr.13744962
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Inhalt/Kritik

Inhaltsverzeichnis1 Introduction.- 2 Content, Concepts, Concept Possession.- 3 Nonconceptual Content.- 4 Arguments from Phenomenology.- 5 The Argument from Contradictory Contents.- 6 Arguments from Concept Possession.- 7 The Epistemological Objection.- 8 The Objection from Objectivity.- 9 Modest Nonconceptualism Vindicated.

Autor

Eva Schmidt is a Research Assistant at the Department of Philosophy at Saarland University, Germany, and a Visiting Lecturer at the University of Luxembourg. Her areas of specialization include philosophy of mind, epistemology, and philosophy of perception. She has published several papers on nonconceptual content and other issues in the philosophy of perception.
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